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experiments to study the impact of negative emotions, such as anger, irritation and 
contempt, on the decision to punish. We investigate experimentally the role that the 
specific punishment technology adopted plays in this context, and test to what extent 
punishing behavior can be truly attributed to negative emotions. We find that a large part 
(around 70%) of the punishment behavior observed in previous PTTG studies is explained 
by the technology of punishment adopted instead of negative emotions. Once this effect is 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the role played by the punishment technology in driving the 
behavior of responders in power-to-take game (PTTG) experiments, and tests to what extent 
it can be truly attributed to negative emotions, such as anger, irritation and contempt. The 
concept of emotion is an elusive one (Frijda, 2007). In psychology and neuroscience, it is 
used to describe a range of discrete, synchronized,  and time-limited  responses (including 
subjective experience, expression, bodily responses and action tendencies) of an individual to 
internal or external events (stimuli) which are relevant or significant to that individual 
(Phelps, 2009). A person experiences positive emotions, such happiness and joy, when his or 
her interests are satisfied or facilitated, and negative emotions, such as sadness and contempt, 
when his or her interests are prevented or opposed. Psychologists and neuroscientists have 
accumulated considerable empirical evidence suggesting that emotions play a very important 
role in the decision-making process (see, e.g., Fridja, 1986; Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; 
Picard, 1997). In particular, one important aspect of emotions is that they motivate the 
individual towards particular actions depending on the context, type and intensity of the 
emotion experienced (Frijda, 1986). For instance, a fearful individual will have a tendency to 
run away from the stimulus responsible for his or her fear, while an envious person will tend 
to seek to possess the valued thing or person (Lazarus, 1991). 
Over the last few decades, economists have also started to pay attention to the 
complexity of emotions on economic scenarios and have been trying to capture the range of 
possible roles that emotions play in the economic decision-making process. For instance, 
emotions have been proposed as an explanation for important economic phenomena such as 
cooperation (Frank, 1988; Fehr and Gächter, 2002) and decision-making under risk 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001), and are seen to have important consequences for many other 
economic phenomena, such as inter-temporal choices (Rick and Lowenstein, 2008), 
competition (Kräkel, 2008), bidding behavior (Bosman and Riedl, 2004) and bargaining 
behavior (Pillutla and Murninghan, 1996). The advent of neuroeconomics has then further 
pushed forward the interest of economists on the role played by emotions in the economic 
decision-making process (for a review on emotions and neuroeconomics, see Phelps, 2009). 
More recently, emotions have also been associated with the automatic and impulsive decision 
system of dual-process theories, according to which human behavior is the result of the 
interaction between this system and a controlled, reflective and rational one (Alos-Ferrer and 
Strack, 2014; Brocas and Carrillo, 2014; Schulz et al., 2014).  
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An important branch of economic research on emotions utilized experiments to study 
the impact of negative emotions, particularly anger, irritation and contempt, on the decision 
to punish (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al., 2005; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007; 
Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Joffily et al., 2013).
1
 This stream of research started with the 
seminal work of Bosman and van Winden (2002) on the PTTG. In the PTTG, there are two 
players, the ‘take authority’ (with income Ytake), and the ‘responder’ (with income Yresp). The 
game is divided into two stages. In the first stage, the take authority selects a take rate t   
[0,1], which is the proportion of the responder’s income that will be transferred to the take 
authority at the end of the game. In the second stage, the responder chooses a destroy rate d   
[0,1], which is the proportion of Yresp that will be destroyed. Therefore, the payoffs of the 
game are (1-t)(1-d)Yresp for the responder, and Ytake + t(1-d) Yresp for the take authority. 
If the subjects are rational profit-maximizing agents, the responder should not destroy 
if the take rate is less than 1, and should be indifferent between all possible destroy rates if 
the take rate is 1. Hence, from backward induction, the take authority should select t = 1 – ε, 
where ε is an infinitesimal positive number. The PTTG can be interpreted as an ultimatum 
game with continuous opportunities to punish and can describe many economic situations 
where an agent can take away any part of the endowment of another agent (e.g. taxation, 
monopolistic pricing and principal-agent relationships) (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). 
Most of the literature on the PTTG investigates the role played by negative emotions 
on responders’ behavior through physiological (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007) and self-report 
measures (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al., 2005). Both measures were found 
to be related to destruction decisions. In particular, participants who experienced intense 
anger, irritation and contempt punished their counterparts more often and more severely. This 
result seems to identify these negative emotions as the main driving force for punishing 
behavior, and the principal source of efficiency costs in this context.
2
 
                                                 
1
 An individual experiences anger, irritation and/or contempt when he or she disapproves of someone else’s 
action and, specifically in the case of anger and irritation, is also displeased about the undesirable event related 
to that action (Ortony et al., 1988). According to the psychological literature on emotions (see, e.g., Lazarus, 
1991), the action tendency that results from these negative emotions is an attack (which can be, for instance, 
psychical, verbal or symbolic) on the blameworthy agent. In economic environments, this may be translated into 
the destruction of the agent’s resources, as it is hypothesized in the aforementioned economic studies on 
emotions and punishing behavior. Note that this impulse to attack does not necessarily result in actual behavior, 
and is often inhibited for personal and social reasons (Averill, 1983; Lazarus, 1991). If we look at the other 
discrete emotions considered in our study, they are not usually associated with aggressive tendencies (Lazarus, 
1991). According to Ortony et al. (1988), some of these emotions (such as happiness and sadness) may not even 
involve an action tendency. 
2
 Other well-established findings from the experimental literature on the PTTG show that people appropriate 
almost 60% of responders’ income, while only 20% of the responders destroy income and usually all of it 
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This literature on the PTTG adopts a technology of punishment characterized by a 
non-constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. This parameter identifies “the income reduction for the 
targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment” (Casari, 
2005:107). The advantage of using this technology of punishment is that it reflects many 
economic and everyday situations modeled by the PTTG to a fairly accurate extent. Take, for 
instance, all the cases where a principal can set a less favorable incentive scheme (e.g. lower 
piece rate) for the agent in order to appropriate a larger share of the profit. The agent can 
retaliate by exerting a lower effort or going on strike in order to reduce the profit, even if this 
goes against his or her own material incentives (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). If the 
principal is particularly unfair, the agent can even quit the job and give up his or her entire 
salary to prevent the principal from benefitting from the agent’s work. This will have little 
cost for the agent but a large one for the principal. On the contrary, if the principal is only 
slightly unfair, the agent will bear a much higher cost from punishing the principal. Another 
example is when, in a bipartisan coalition government, one political party (the leading one) 
takes the majority of the places in the cabinet or dictates most of the coalition’s political 
agenda. The members of the other party may decide to reduce their support and even bring 
the government to a collapse, even though this will cause them to step down from power. The 
cost they will have to bear to punish the other party’s members is small (large) if the leading 
party has been very (only marginally) unfair. In both examples, the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is not 
constant and increases with the initial offence of the principal, in one case, and the leading 
party, in the other. 
Although the results of the standard PTTG can be easily generalized to many real-
world situations, they may lack internal validity, especially in their attempt to link 
punishment behavior with negative emotions. In particular, the non-constant ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio adopted in previous studies of the PTTG may explain all or part of the relationship 
between punishing behavior and negative emotions observed in this context. In the standard 
PTTG, the income reduction for the authority is tdYresp, whereas the cost for the responder to 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Reuben and van Winden, 2010). Small differences were observed between an 
effort treatment (where endowments were earned by performing a preliminary individual real effort task) and a 
no-effort treatment (where endowments were exogenously given by the experimenter) (Bosman et al., 2005). A 
group version of the PTTG, where decisions were made by groups, produced the same results qualitatively as 
the no-group experiment (Bosman et al., 2006). Furthermore, in a three-player version of the PTTG with one 
take authority and two responders, Reuben and van Winden (2008) show that responders who knew each other 
from outside the laboratory punish and coordinate more than strangers. The PTTG has also been used to study 
the influence of participation (Albert and Mertins, 2008), gender pairing (Sutter et al., 2009) and waiting time 
(Galeotti, 2013) on economic decision-making. 
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punish is            . Therefore, the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is                     
     , where t (the proportion of the responder’s income that will be transferred to the take 
authority) is an endogenous and non-constant parameter. This implies that the ‘demand’ for 
punishment is higher when t is higher (i.e. the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is higher). In other words, for 
high take rates the responder has a higher incentive to punish his or her counterpart, whereas 
for low take rates the incentive is lower. This means that when the offence is severe, subjects 
may punish because punishing is cheaper and not, or not only, because they experience anger, 
irritation or contempt. It is important to test whether or not this is the case in order to provide 
a correct measure of the efficiency costs associated with negative emotions (what Bosman 
and van Widen (2002) refer to as emotional hazard). 
In order to investigate to what extent the punishment behavior observed in previous 
studies on PTTGs is explained by the specific punishment technology adopted rather than 
negative emotions, we conducted a laboratory experiment. We varied the extent to which the 
punishment technology embedded a variable or constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.3 Emotions were 
assessed through self-report measures, as in previous studies.
4
 As mentioned earlier, a PTTG 
which employs a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is a more natural environment, and has a broader 
external validity than a PTTG with a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. The latter, on the other hand, 
provides more internally valid results. This suggests that an experimental approach of the 
kind we propose, where both PTTGs with constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios are 
considered, would be extremely useful to complement previous studies on PTTGs, and could 
contribute to a better understanding of the role played by negative emotions in this context. 
To give a very brief overview of our results, we found that a large part (around 70%) 
of the punishment behavior observed in previous PTTG studies is explained by the 
technology of punishment adopted rather than negative emotions. In a PTTG with a constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, negative emotions still play an important role, but much smaller. This 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the experimental design, Section 3 describes 
                                                 
3
 Real-world situations captured by a PTTG with a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio are less common than those 
modeled by a PTTG with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, but still present. An example is the punitive destruction 
of own resources which have been (or are about to be) taken by an enemy in a conflict. Although these resources 
are gone, a party can decide to destroy them at a certain constant marginal cost (e.g.   amount of explosive for 
each unit of resources to be destroyed) in order to punish the counterpart. In war conflicts, this could be done 
not only for punitive but also strategic or operational reasons, and it is usually referred to as a scorched earth 
strategy. 
4
 For a discussion on the reliability of self-reports in measuring emotions, see Bosman and van Winden (2002) 
and Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009). 
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the theoretical background and the behavioral hypotheses, Section 4 reports the results, and 
Section 5 concludes.  
2. Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted between March and September 2012 at the University 
of East Anglia, with 282 students participating over many sessions.
5
 Each session lasted on 
average 50 minutes. No subject was allowed to participate in more than one session. Subjects 
received a show-up fee of £5 and earned on average £9.41 (around 15 US dollars). In order to 
ensure the greatest comparability of our experiment with previous literature, we tried to 
replicate, as close as possible, the experimental procedures adopted in previous PTTG 
experiments. In particular, we (a) conducted a paper-and-pencil experiment, (b) employed the 
same instructions, exercises, examples and procedures as previous PTTG studies,
6
 (c) 
avoided any particular or suggestive terminology during the sessions, such as ‘take authority’ 
or ‘take rate’, (d) adopted the same payment procedure as Bosman and van Winden (2002), 
and (e) assessed emotions on a 7-point Likert scale via self-reports after each subject learned 
about the decision of their counterpart.
7
 More details about the experimental procedure are 
provided below.
8
 
Upon arrival, each subject was randomly assigned the role of participant A (take 
authority) or participant B (responder) by drawing a letter from an urn, then randomly 
allocated to a computer workstation which was isolated from other workstations via 
partitions. The instructions were then distributed and read aloud to provide common 
                                                 
5
 Details of the socioeconomic characteristics of the subjects and experimental instructions are contained within 
the on-line appendix. 
6
 Minor adjustments to the original instructions were made to fit them to our laboratory routines, monetary 
payments and comparability of our treatments. 
7
 In our and previous work on the PTTG, emotions were assessed via single items. There is an ongoing debate 
on the reliability of multi-item versus single-item measures of psychological constructs (see, e.g., Gogol et al., 
2014). Single-item measures are generally less reliable than the corresponding multi-item scales. Hence, a 
potential limitation of our and previous experiments is that different emotions might be associated with different 
effects on behavior because of a different degree of reliability between the measures of emotions. Single-item 
measures have, on the other hand, the advantage of being easy and fast to fill out. This was quite desirable in our 
experiment since we assessed many emotions. For example, if the questionnaire was too long and tedious, 
subjects might lose concentration or experience other emotions, such as irritation, annoyance, frustration or 
resentment (which could, in turn, affect their answers to the questionnaire). Future studies could be devoted to 
evaluate whether, and to what extent, the use of single-item measures of emotions is a concern in PTTG 
experiments. 
8
 We also ran separate sessions for UK students and non-UK students. This is because we wanted to re-create, at 
least for half of the sessions (i.e. those with UK subjects), a laboratory environment analogous to the one used in 
previous PTTG studies where most of the participants shared a similar cultural background; and to control, in a 
systematic way, that negative emotions were not driven by the subjects’ perceptions of cultural dishomogeneity 
in a given session. However, the data analysis did not detect any differences in emotions and punishment 
behavior between UK and non-UK students. 
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information to the subjects. Two individual computerized exercises followed in order to 
check the subjects’ understanding of these instructions. Clarifications were individually 
provided to subjects with incorrect answers. After completion of these exercises, each 
participant A was randomly matched with a participant B by asking each participant A to 
randomly choose a coded envelope which was linked to a certain participant B. Each 
participant A was then asked to fill in the take rate, that is the proportion of participant B’s 
endowment that would be transferred to participant A at the end of the experiment, on the 
form that was placed inside the envelope. Afterwards, the envelopes containing the forms 
were collected and given to all participants B who were asked to complete the form with the 
destroy rate, that is the proportion of their endowment that will be destroyed. The envelopes 
with the forms inside were then given back to all participants A, who could take note of the 
decision of their corresponding matches. Subsequently, each subject was asked to fill in a 
questionnaire concerning emotions, expectations about the decision of their counterpart,
9
 and 
personal information. Meanwhile, the envelopes were collected and handed to the cashier 
who was outside the laboratory and, hence, not present during the experiment. Subjects were 
then privately paid one-by-one outside the laboratory by the cashier. 
As in Bosman and van Winden (2002), we assessed a list of eleven emotions. To not 
direct the attention of the subjects to specific emotions, the list included both negative 
emotions that previous studies had found relevant for explaining punishing behavior observed 
in the PTTG (i.e. anger, irritation, contempt), other less influential negative emotions (i.e. 
envy, jealousy, sadness, shame, fear), positive emotions (i.e. joy, happiness) and neutral 
emotions (i.e. surprise). Subjects were asked to state how much they felt each emotion on a 7-
point Likert scale when they learned about the decision of their counterparts. The scale 
ranged from “no emotion at all” to “high intensity of the emotion” (Bosman and van Winden, 
2002). 
We ran two different treatments where we varied the nature of the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
embedded in the punishment technology (constant or variable).
10
 In one treatment, the ‘fine-
to-fee’ ratio was increasing in the take rate and ranged from 0 to infinite. This treatment was 
an exact replication of previous PTTG experiments (i.e. Bosman and van Winden, 2002; 
                                                 
9
 Each participant B was asked to indicate which percentage of his or her endowment he or she expected 
participant A would decide to transfer to himself or herself; each participant A was asked to indicate which 
percentage of the transfer he or she expected participant B to destroy. 
10
 In total, we collected 70 independent observations under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, and 71 under a constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. An independent observation is a pair consisting of a responder and a take authority. The 
variation in the number of independent observations across the two treatments is due to different rates of 
attendance across sessions. 
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Bosman et al., 2005). In the other treatment, we employed a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, 
which was therefore independent of the take rate. Most of the literature on punishment 
behavior in economics usually employs ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios ranging from 0 to 4 (Nikiforakis 
and Normann, 2008; Carpenter, 2007). We chose a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio equal to 2.11 
Note that the purpose of our study was not to show how people react to changes in the price 
of punishing (as in Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Carpenter, 2007), but to provide a 
correct measure of the efficiency costs attributed to negative emotions. To this end, a constant 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio equal to 2 is optimal as it maximizes comparability with the other treatment 
where the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is variable, and with previous PTTG experiments. Note in fact 
that a ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio equal to 2 corresponds, under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, to a take 
rate of    , which is roughly equivalent to the mean and median take rate observed in 
previous PTTG experiments, and obtained in our treatment with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. 
Hence, when we compare the two treatments, we have approximately half the observations 
where the incentive to punish is lower in the “constant fine-to-fee ratio” treatment, and the 
other half where the incentive is higher. This allowed us to measure the bias, if there was any, 
which may have occurred in the standard PTTG for both sides of the distribution of the take 
rates: when       (i.e. when the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ was lower than the constant ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio), and when       (i.e. when the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ was higher than the 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio). A constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio equal to 2 has also been extensively 
used in previous economic experiments to study punishment behavior (e.g. de Quervain et 
al., 2004; Cubitt et al., 2011) and, therefore, it enables comparisons with other studies which 
do not use the PTTG as a vehicle of research. 
Figure 1 displays how the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio evolved over different values of the take 
rate in the two treatments. The graph clearly shows that under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio the 
effectiveness of the punishment increases exponentially as the take rate increases. As a 
consequence, subjects might punish simply because it is more ‘convenient’ to do so and not 
(or not only) because they experience negative emotions (which is to be expected for 
increasing take rates).In other words, in this set-up, the idiosyncratic features of the 
punishment technology might induce an effect on behavior which can be erroneously 
                                                 
11
 A value of 2 means that the cost of punishing is half of how much the punishment reduces participant A’s 
endowment. In order to employ a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio equal to 2, we simply stated in the instructions that 
“for each 1% of his or her endowment that participant B decides to destroy, 10 pence of the transfer to 
participant A will be destroyed as well”. In addition, we allowed subjects to deduct the cost of punishing from 
their show-up fee, if needed. For this reason, the show-up fee was set at the level of £5 to ensure that, at worst, 
subjects (in particular, participants B) could leave the experiment with £2.50 in their pockets. This ensured that 
participants B could punish participants A for any possible value of the take rate without incurring losses. 
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attributed to negative emotions. This possibility was instead ruled out in the constant ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio treatment. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
3. Theoretical background 
In this section, we briefly discuss the theoretical implications of having a constant 
versus variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, embedded in the punishment technology, for the behavior 
and emotions of the responder in the PTTG, and present the hypotheses that can be tested. 
We build on the model that Loewenstein (2000) proposed to describe the impact of visceral 
factors in the utility function of an agent. Let           be the utility function of a generic 
responder i, in which    is the consumption activity, in our case the size of the punishment, 
and    the visceral state, in our case the experience of anger, irritation or contempt. If we call 
  
  the optimal punishment, this may rise if the intensity of the negative emotion (  ) rises as 
well (   
        ). In the context of the PTTG, the responder may experience emotional 
distress when, for instance, the decision of his or her counterpart is perceived as unkind or 
when the distribution of the income becomes unequal, which may occur every time that    
increases. To mitigate this distress, the responder may decide to punish.  
Anger, irritation or contempt may not be the only explanation for the decision to 
punish. The responder may, for instance, punish because he or she feels the need to comply 
with what he or she believes is the appropriate behavior in the laboratory (Zizzo, 2010) or 
because he or she misunderstands the instructions or the incentives in the experiment.
12
 In 
addition to these alternative explanations of punishing behavior, the decision to punish may 
also be sensitive to more traditional economic incentives, such as the cost per unit of 
punishment that the responder needs to pay in order to damage the counterpart, which is a 
measure of the effectiveness of the punishment (Carpenter, 2007; Nikiforakis and Normann, 
2008). To formalize all this, let us assume that optimal punishment (  
 ) depends on the 
intensity of the negative emotion (anger, irritation or contempt) which, in turn, depends on 
the take rate experienced by the individual (  ), the effectiveness of the punishment, which is 
equivalent to the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (  ), and a generic parameter    which captures everything 
                                                 
12
 A significant part of the behavior observed in experiments may be attributed to confusion or mistakes, as, for 
instance, Andreoni (1995) found in the context of public good games. Confusion and mistakes may explain why 
a responder punishes in the PTTG, since the only possible direction in which a responder can make a mistake is 
towards punishment. 
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else, including confusion, mistakes and experimenter demand effects.
13
 We can write the 
optimal punishment as: 
  
    
                
The optimal level of punishment weakly increases in the take rate (          ). In 
addition, it weakly increases in the fine-to-fee ratio (           .
14
 Under a variable ‘fine-
to-fee’ ratio,    is an increasing function of   . Remember that             . This means 
that the punishment may be even higher if    increases (i.e.    may have a multiplier effect on 
the decision to punish by means of the non-constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio). This multiplier effect 
is given by                         
  , and is exponentially increasing in   . In 
contrast, if the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is a constant (     ), its impact on the decision to punish 
should be the same across different levels of    (i.e. there is no multiplier effect). By 
comparing a situation where the punishment technology embeds a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
with a situation where the punishment technology is characterized by a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio, we can not only measure how much of the punishment is actually attributable to the 
multiplier effect rather than emotional distress,
15
 but also whether negative emotions matter 
at all. Note in fact that it is possible that           and          . If the latter is the 
case, punishment is better explained by the parameter    rather than anger, irritation or 
contempt. Based on this simple model that describes the motivations of the responder to 
punish, we can formulate the following three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. In the standard PTTG, the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio produces a 
multiplier effect on the decision to punish, that is                      , and thus the role 
of other factors, including negative emotions, is inflated. 
We can test this hypothesis by studying how the difference in punishment evolves 
between a constant and a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio when the take rate increases. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no such multiplier effect, that is                      . 
                                                 
13
 For simplicity, we also assume perfect separability between    and   , that is    does not affect    and vice 
versa. 
14
 If the responder displays a rational and self-interested behavior, he or she should never destroy if     , and 
be indifferent between any levels of punishment if     . This is irrespective of the size of the ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio. In other words,            and          . If his or her behavior is driven by reciprocity (Rabin, 
1993; Duwfenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004), the punishment should be more likely when    increases (i.e. 
   /   ≥ 0), caeteris paribus, and less likely when   increases (i.e.    /  ≥ 0), caeteris paribus. If the 
responder cares about equality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the punishment should be more likely when    
increases (i.e.    /   ≥ 0), caeteris paribus. For any given level of   , the punishment should also be weakly 
increasing in   (i.e.    /  ≥ 0). The proofs are contained in the on-line appendix. 
15
 Note that it is not possible to separate the multiplier effect, caused by the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, from the 
arousal effect, caused by the negative emotion, using statistical analysis on the data collected from previous 
PTTG studies. This is because of the very high correlation between negative emotions and the take rate. 
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Hypothesis 2. Once the multiplier effect is removed, the intensity of anger, irritation 
or contempt does still explain the punishing behavior of the responder, that is          .  
We can test this hypothesis against the null hypothesis that punishing is due to 
something else (e.g. confusion, experimenter demand effects) by looking at whether these 
negative emotions do still explain punishing behavior when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is constant.  
Hypothesis 3. Due to the multiplier effect, anger, irritation and contempt erroneously 
predict much more punishing behavior under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio compared to a 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, that is    
        
      , where   
  is the level of punishment 
with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, and   
  is the level of punishment with a constant ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio.  
Hypothesis 3 can be tested by comparing how much of the punishing behavior is 
explained by these negative emotions under a variable versus a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. 
4. Results 
In this section, we first check whether there was any difference in the behavior of the 
take authorities across the treatments. Then we move to the main focus of this study, that is 
the punishing behavior of the responder, to test whether there exists any difference in the 
standard PTTG compared to the modified version of the PTTG where the punishment 
technology embeds a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. Next, we look at emotions and the extent to 
which anger, irritation and contempt explain the punishing behavior of the responders. 
Finally, we briefly consider the expectations of the responders, and whether they help to 
understand behavior and emotions. 
Behavior of the take authorities. Table 1 displays the take rates for the two treatments. 
The values are in line with previous PTTG experiments. If we compare the behavior of the 
subjects under constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios, there was no significant difference 
between the take rates (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.191).
16
 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
16
 A Tobit regression (reported in the on-line appendix), where we control for the demographic characteristics of 
the subjects, confirms this result. In this regression, we also find that non-UK subjects display significantly 
higher take rates than UK subjects. Different conjectures (discussed in the on-line appendix) might explain why 
non-UK take authorities appropriated more resources than UK take authorities. In the on-line appendix, we also 
analyze the emotions of the take authorities. 
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Behavior of the responders. We define the punishment rate as the proportion of the 
amount taken by the take authority that was destroyed by the responder.
17
 As discussed in 
Section 3, the punishment rate may depend on the amount taken by the take authority because 
of several psychological reasons, such as inequality aversion and reciprocity. Hence, we need 
to control, in the analysis of the punishing behavior, for the impact of the take rate. Figure 2 
displays the scatterplots and the locally weighted smoothed regressions of the punishment 
rate as a function of the take rate, for each of the treatments. When the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was 
variable, the punishment rate rose exponentially as the take rate increased. When the ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio was instead constant, subjects increased their punishment less in response to higher 
take rates. This is preliminary evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. In particular, it seems that, 
under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, there was a multiplier effect at work which induced more 
punishment from the responders when the take rate increased. We tested this more formally 
with non-parametric techniques. In particular, we grouped the take rates into four classes 
based on their distribution: the very low take rates (the bottom 25%), the low take rates 
(between 25% and 50%), the high take rates (between 50% and 75%), and the very high take 
rates (the top 25%).
18
 This distinction enabled us to investigate the punishing behavior 
controlling for different levels of the take rate, and also discriminated between take rates for 
which the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was lower than the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, and vice 
versa. Note in fact that the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio crosses the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio 
at        (see Figure 1), which is slightly above the median of the distribution of the take 
rates. Hence, for the very low and low take rates, the incentive to punish was higher under a 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. In contrast, for the high and very high take rates, the opposite is 
true, that is the incentive to punish was higher under the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.19  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Table 2 displays the average punishment rates for the two treatments. If we compare 
the punishment rate of sessions characterized by a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio with sessions 
where the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was variable, we find that, when the take rates were very high, 
                                                 
17
 The punishment rate coincides with the destroy rate under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, and is equal to      
under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, that is the amount destroyed (           ) over the amount taken 
(            .  
18
 The 25th quartile corresponds to a take rate of 0.5, the 50
th
 quartile (median) to a take rate of 0.6, and the 75
th
 
quartile to a take rate of 0.8. Hence,    is classified as very low take rate if       , low take rate if        
   , high take rate if           , and very high take rate if       . 
19
 To be precise, among the high take rates, there were 3 out of 38 observations at        , which were 
slightly below        and where, therefore, the incentive to punish can be considered as identical between the 
constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.  
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punishment was significantly more severe under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (Mann-Whitney 
test, p = 0.017). In contrast, when the take rates were very low, subjects seemed to punish 
more under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. However, the difference was not statistically 
significant (p = 0.286). For low and high take rates, the punishment rates were very similar 
across the two treatments, and the difference was not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney 
test, p > 0.1). 
[Table 2 about here] 
We tested the robustness of these findings using Tobit regression analysis (see Table 
3).
20
 The dependent variable was the punishment rate (  ). The independent variables were, in 
Regression 1, the take rate received from the take authority (  ), a dummy variable which 
took value 1 when a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was employed, the nationality of the subjects 
(non-UK = 1 for non-UK), and two interaction terms of the dummy used to identify the 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio with nationality and the take rate respectively. In Regression 2, we 
also controlled for the experience of the subjects in previous experiments,
21
 their gender 
(Male = 1 for male subjects), and age. The coefficient of the variable ‘take rate’ was positive 
and statistically significant, meaning that the take rate from the take authority negatively 
affected the punishment behavior of the responder when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was variable. 
Under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the relationship between the take rate and the punishment 
rate was also negative but markedly weaker. This brings us to the following result which 
supports Hypothesis 1. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Result 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, 70% (-
2.727/3.885) of the punishment triggered by the take rate was attributable to the multiplier 
effect. 
Under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the punishment rates were generally higher 
compared to a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. This was captured by the positive and significant 
coefficient of the dummy     . Hence, when the take rates were low, punishment was higher 
under the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio and, when the take rates were high, it was higher under 
                                                 
20
 There were 87 left-censored observations and 19 right-censored. We also tried a logit regression where the 
dependent variable was a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if the responder destroyed and 0 otherwise. The 
results were similar to those presented in this paper. However, this approach omits much of the information 
about the punishment rate and, therefore, is less preferred than the approach based on the Tobit model. The 
results of the logit are reported in the on-line appendix. 
21
 The data for ‘experience’ was collected from the final questionnaire provided to the subjects. In particular, 
subjects were asked to indicate whether they had previously participated in “0”, “1”, “2” or “3 or more than 3” 
experiments. 
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the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. This is shown in Figure 3, where we plotted the predicted 
punishment rate for the constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios respectively against the take 
rates. In particular, for take rates lower than 56%, the predicted punishment was higher under 
the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, whereas, for take rates higher than 56%, the predicted 
punishment was higher under the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.22 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Role of emotions. We now turn to the analysis of the emotions experienced by the 
responders. We will initially consider all the emotions (positive, negative and neutral), to 
check whether there existed any similarity between them and to investigate which emotions 
were driven by the take rate. We will then focus on anger, irritation and contempt, to study 
the emotional basis of the punishing behavior. 
First, it is worth pointing out that, as seen in the literature, different emotions capture 
similar underlying emotional states. In particular, anger was strongly positively correlated to 
irritation (Spearman ρ = 0.75, p = 0.000), envy to jealousy (ρ = 0.83, p = 0.000) and 
happiness to joy (ρ = 0.79, p = 0.000). The full list of correlations is displayed in Table 4. To 
obtain an idea of the underlying structure of the discrete emotions assessed, we also 
conducted an exploratory factor analysis. This yielded two factors which appear to capture 
the valence (positive or negative) of the emotions considered. The factor loadings are 
displayed in Table 5.
23
 Fear, envy, anger, sadness, shame, irritation, contempt and jealousy 
form a ‘negative valence factor’, while happiness and joy comprise a ‘positive valence 
factor’. The eigenvalue for the negative valence factor is 3.539, while for the positive valence 
factor it is 1.889. 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
In order to study whether and which emotions were driven by the take rate, we first 
looked at the patterns of the locally weighted smoothed regression lines between the intensity 
of each emotion and the take rate, for each of the treatments (Figure 4). There seemed to be 
no differences across treatments on how the take rate impacted on each emotion. This was 
                                                 
22
 Among the other explanatory variables, the only statistically significant coefficient was the one for age. In 
particular, older subjects punish less than younger ones. 
23
 We consider factor loadings with a value above 0.45 based on Hair et al.'s (1998) rules of thumb. The only 
emotion that did not pass this threshold was surprise. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
(0.751) indicates that factor analysis is appropriate. The on-line appendix contains a plot of the eigenvalues 
against the number of factors in their order of extraction (scree test), a scatter plot of the factor loadings, and a 
full list of the factor loadings. 
 15 
 
confirmed in non-parametric tests where, for each class of the take rates, we compared the 
intensity of each emotion between the variable and constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios. None of these 
comparisons were statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0.1). Figure 4 also 
provides some preliminary evidence of a positive relationship between take rate and negative 
emotions, and of a negative relationship between take rate and positive emotions.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
We tested for this using ordered logit regressions, one for each emotion. The 
dependent variable was the emotion of interest (  ), whereas the independent variables were 
the take rate received from the take authority, a dummy variable which took the value of 1 
when a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was employed, experience, gender (Male = 1 for male 
subjects), age, nationality of the subjects (non-UK = 1 for non-UK subjects), and two 
interaction terms, one between the dummy for the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio and nationality, 
and another between the dummy for the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio and the take rate. 24 The 
results of these regressions are shown in Table 6. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Negative emotions (in particular, anger and irritation) were significantly positively 
related to the take rate. Similarly, happiness was significantly negatively related to the take 
rate. This evidence is consistent with previous PTTG studies and the theory presented 
earlier.
25
 It is also robust regardless of the background of the subjects (UK versus non-UK 
students) and the type of punishment technology employed. 
We now consider the punishing behavior of the subjects and to what extent it can be 
explained by negative emotions. In the previous analysis of the relationship between 
punishing behavior and take rate, we found that, for take rates below the median, the 
punishment rate was higher under the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, whereas for take rates 
above the median, the punishment rate was higher under the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. This 
means that the bias in the predictive power of negative emotions that may characterize a 
PTTG with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio may be negative when the take rates are below the 
                                                 
24
 In the regressions, we employed robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. Due to some subjects 
failing to report all the emotions, we have 1 missing observation for sadness, shame and envy (140 observations 
instead of 141), and 3 missing observations for contempt (138 observations instead of 141). The qualitative 
results do not change if we do not include the demographic variables among the explanatory variables. The 
results of the regressions without the demographics are reported in the on-line appendix. 
25
 The coefficients of the other explanatory variables were mostly not significant. We briefly mention here those 
which were significant. In particular, subjects with increasing experience in laboratory experiments felt less fear 
(p = 0.012) and joy (p = 0.027). Older subjects experienced less fear (p = 0.044), anger (p = 0.043), sadness (p = 
0.055) and jealousy (p = 0.049). Non-UK subjects under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio were, on average, sadder 
(p = 0.041). Finally, male subjects experienced more sadness (p = 0.052) and jealousy (p = 0.056). 
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median, and positive when take rates are above the median, compared to a PTTG with a 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. It is thus important to distinguish between the role played by 
emotions when the take rates are low, and their role when the take rates are high. To do so, 
we estimated, for each emotion, the following model: 
                                                            
                                        
                                
where    is the punishment rate,    the intensity of the emotion of interest,       a 
dummy which is equal to 1 when the responder experiences a take rate below the median take 
rate (  ),      the dummy which identifies the treatment with a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, 
     a dummy for the nationality of the subject (= 1 for non-UK subjects),            the 
experience of the subject in economic experiments, and     and     the age and gender 
(Male = 1 for male subjects) respectively of the subject. To estimate the model, we ran a 
battery of Tobit regressions, one for each emotion.
26
 Table 7 displays the results of the 
regressions for anger, irritation and contempt. We focused on these emotions as they were the 
emotions which more likely predicted the punishing behavior in previous PTTG studies. The 
on-line appendix contains the analysis for each of the other emotions. 
[Table 7 about here] 
For low take rates, an increase in the intensity of contempt induced responders to 
punish more (  = 45.42) under both a variable and a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.
27
 None of 
the other two negative emotions seem to explain the punishing behavior for low take rates. 
This brings us to the following result which, with respect to contempt, supports Hypothesis 2 
and rejects Hypothesis 3. 
Result 2. In line with Hypothesis 2, but in contrast to Hypothesis 3, contempt was the 
only negative emotion that explained the punishing behavior of the responders for low take 
rates, and its effect was similar under both a variable and a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.  
Looking now at high take rates we note that, in line with previous literature, subjects 
who experienced higher anger, irritation and contempt punished more. In particular, under a 
variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, a one-unit increase in the intensity of anger, irritation and 
contempt produced a 28.37%, 32.04% and 45.42% increase respectively in the punishment 
                                                 
26
 We used robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. If we exclude the demographic variables 
from the explanatory variables, the results remain qualitatively the same. The results of these regressions are 
reported in the on-line appendix. 
27
 The interaction between contempt and the dummy for the constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio is positive (as expected) 
but not significant. 
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rate.
28
 However, much of this increase was due to the multiplier effect caused by the ‘fine-to-
fee’ ratio. Indeed the impact of irritation, anger and contempt on the decision to punish in 
response to high take rates was hugely attenuated when we employed a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ 
ratio. In particular, a one-unit increase in irritation, anger and contempt raised the punishment 
by only 2.96%, 4.45%, and 13.41% respectively when the ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio was constant. 
This evidence supports both Hypotheses 2 and 3. We now present Results 3 and 4. 
Result 3. In line with Hypothesis 2, anger, irritation and contempt explain the 
punishing behavior, even when we neutralize the multiplier effect caused by the variable 
‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.  
Result 4. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the multiplier effect causes a bias when the 
take rates are high, and this bias accounts for 90.76%, 87.31% and 70.48% respectively of 
how much irritation, anger and contempt explain the punishing behavior in the PTTG with a 
variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio.29 
Looking at the other covariates, the emotional response of UK and non-UK subjects 
had a similar impact on the decision to punish, and was not affected by which technology 
punishment was employed. In contrast, subjects with increasing experience in economic 
experiments were more able to cope with contempt, as they punished significantly less when 
they experienced such an emotion compared to the inexperienced or less experienced 
subjects.
30
 Note that experience in previous economic experiments did not eliminate the 
effect of contempt on punishing behavior, but only reduced it.  
Role of expectations. As in previous PTTG studies, we also considered the role played 
by expectations in driving behavior and emotions.
31
 First, we note that there was no 
statistically significant difference in the way in which responders reported their expectations 
under constant and variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios (Mann-Whitney p = 0.422). Figure 5 shows 
that responders who punished were generally subjects who expected lower take rates than the 
actual ones (dots above the 45° line). This is consistent with previous findings on the PTTG. 
                                                 
28
 Note that the interaction between contempt and the dummy for high take rates is not significant, meaning that 
the effect of contempt for high take rates is the same as for low take rates. 
29
 The bias is calculated as             for anger,             for irritation, and             for contempt. 
30
 The differences in contempt due to experience may be attributed to a difference in expectations concerning 
the take rate rather than to a difference in coping. To test for this possibility, we also conducted a Tobit 
regression, where we included the expected take rate among the explanatory variables. The result did not 
change. Hence, we concluded that more experienced subjects punish less because they are able to cope better 
with contempt, and not because they have different expectations compared to less experienced subjects. 
31
 As in previous PTTG studies, expectations were not incentivized. This was because we did not want to 
introduce any distortion that would have limited the comparability of our study with previous literature. For a 
discussion of the reliability of measuring expectations without financial incentives, see Bosman et al. (2005). 
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In particular, 37 of the 77 optimistic responders (48.05%) punished the take authority, 
whereas only 17 of the 64 pessimistic responders (26.56%) punished. The difference 
achieved statistical significance (χ2 = 6.83, p = 0.009).32 
[Figure 5 about here] 
We also studied whether emotions and behavior were affected by expectations. In 
particular, we included expectations for each regression of Table 6.
33
 It turns out that 
expectations have a significant positive impact on envy and jealousy (p = 0.031 and 0.015 
respectively). In other words, responders who expected higher take rates from the take 
authority, especially in comparison to the actual take rate, were more envious and jealous 
when they learnt about the decision of their counterpart. Finally, we included expectations in 
the regression of Tables 3 and 7. However, they do not seem to play a significant role in 
explaining the punishment behavior of the responders.  
5. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the experimental literature in economics that looks at the 
role of emotions on the decision to punish. In particular, we investigated whether previous 
findings about emotions and behavior in the PTTG were explained by the punishment 
technology adopted, and to what extent punishment can be truly attributed to negative 
emotions. 
Our results provide clear-cut evidence that, in the standard PTTG, as much as 70% of 
the punishment triggered by the take rate is attributable to the multiplier effect caused by the 
variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. This confirms Hypothesis 1. When we turn to the role played by 
negative emotions we find that, consistent with Hypothesis 2, they are still important 
predictors of the punishing behavior in the PTTG. In particular, anger, irritation and contempt 
appeared to be important driving forces for the punishing behavior of responders, especially 
in response to high take rates, and even once we controlled for the punishment technology. 
However, as postulated by Hypothesis 3, in the PTTG with variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, their 
effect is magnified by as much as 90% for high take rates.  
                                                 
32
 The result holds if we conduct a separate test for the treatment with a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (χ2 = 3.544, p 
= 0.060) and one for the treatment with a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio (χ2 = 3.077, p = 0.079). Since expectations 
were elicited at the end of the experiment, it might be possible that subjects wrongly reported them. In 
particular, over-optimistic responders might have found it difficult to admit that they were wrong. If such bias 
exists, we should observe a correlation between expected take rates and actual take rates. However, this 
correlation was low and not significant (Spearman ρ = 0.025, p = 0.772). 
33
 We tried different specifications to account for expectations. In one specification, we simply added among the 
explanatory variables the expected take rate. In another specification, we included the difference between the 
take rate and the expected take rate. The results were the same.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Take rates 
Treatment n. Mean St. dev. 
Variable σ 70 64.2 25.20 
Constant σ 71 58.7 27.85 
 
Table 2: Punishment rates 
Treatment Very Low t Low t High t Very High t 
Constant σ 36.17 (18.6) 58.43 (2.7) 76.6 (5.15) 93 (7.05) 
Variable σ 31.39 (19.27)  59.12 (1.96) 73.08 (5.96) 97.5 (4.27) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
Table 3: Tobit regression on punishment rates 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 
 B se p B se P 
   3.885*** 1.077 0 4.009*** 1.005 0 
      ×    -2.727** 1.126 0.017 -2.841*** 1.063 0.008 
     162.285** 79.792 0.044 158.868** 74.332 0.034 
     × non-UK -6.019 39.41 0.879 3.95 39.673 0.921 
non-UK 26.465 29.38 0.369 30.978 29.276 0.292 
Experience    -5.528 8.564 0.52 
Male    -30.789 19.387 0.115 
Age    -3.951** 1.972 0.047 
Constant -285.573*** 81.39 0.001 -172* 89.096 0.056 
Obs 141   141   
Pseudo R-Square 0.075   0.085   
Df 136   133   
Prob > F 0.001   0.002   
Note: Tobit regression with robust standard errors.    and    are expressed in 
percentage  Hence, the beta coefficients identifies percentages. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Correlations of the emotions 
 F
ea
r 
E
n
v
y
 
A
n
g
er
 
S
ad
n
es
s 
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in
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S
h
am
e 
Ir
ri
ta
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
te
m
p
t 
Jo
y
 
Je
al
o
u
sy
 
S
u
rp
ri
se
 
Fear 1 
          
Envy 0.40 1 
         
Anger 0.27 0.54 1 
        
Sadness 0.40 0.48 0.59 1 
       
Happiness 0.04 -0.18 -0.25 -0.05 1 
      
Shame 0.26 0.13 0.39 0.39 0.27 1 
     
Irritation 0.24 0.46 0.75 0.45 -0.28 0.33 1 
    
Contempt 0.20 0.23 0.47 0.37 0.11 0.42 0.48 1 
   
Joy 0.12 -0.13 -0.16 0.05 0.79 0.30 -0.16 0.19 1 
  
Jealousy 0.38 0.83 0.53 0.48 -0.11 0.17 0.47 0.28 -0.13 1 
 
Surprise 0.06 -0.16 0.09 0.05 0.25 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.29 -0.16 1 
Note: The table displays Spearman's rank correlation coefficients. Coefficients in bold are values above 0.7. 
Table 5: Factor loadings for factor analysis 
Emotion Negative valence factor Positive valence factor Uniqueness 
fear 0.518 
 
0.732 
envy 0.699 
 
0.438 
anger 0.811 
 
0.332 
sadness 0.699 
 
0.513 
happiness  0.837 0.245 
shame 0.487 
 
0.645 
irritation 0.747 
 
0.424 
contempt 0.538 
 
0.684 
joy 
 
0.843 0.278 
jealousy 0.722 
 
0.431 
Note: Loadings for factor analysis using oblique rotation. We consider factor loadings greater than ± 0.45 (see 
Hair et al., 1998). Surprise is not included as it does not pass this cut-off. A full list of the loadings is reported in 
the on-line appendix.  
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Table 6: Ordered logit regressions on emotions  
 
 
Fear Envy Anger Sadness Happiness Shame 
 
b se p b se P b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   0 0.01 0.63 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.04*** 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.66 -0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.31 
     0.11 0.86 0.9 -0.61 0.92 0.51 0.48 0.81 0.56 -1.07 0.79 0.18 0.66 1.09 0.54 1.19 1.39 0.39 
     ×    0 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.01 0.62 -0.01 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.01 0.58 -0.01 0.02 0.51 -0.02 0.02 0.41 
non-UK 1.09* 0.57 0.06 0.17 0.51 0.74 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.6 0.46 0.19 0.29 0.52 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.32 
Experience -0.37** 0.15 0.01 -0.12 0.14 0.41 -0.02 0.16 0.88 -0.19 0.15 0.2 -0.07 0.19 0.72 -0.11 0.19 0.56 
     × non-UK 0.05 0.77 0.95 -0.08 0.65 0.9 0.34 0.67 0.61 1.37** 0.67 0.04 -0.11 0.7 0.88 0.5 0.84 0.55 
Male -0.28 0.4 0.48 0.2 0.35 0.57 0.42 0.38 0.27 0.66* 0.34 0.05 0.29 0.4 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.32 
Age -0.08** 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.13 -0.07** 0.03 0.04 -0.06* 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.89 0.04 0.04 0.38 
Obs. 141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140 
  
141 
  
140 
  Pseudo R-Square 0.05 
  
0.02 
  
0.07 
  
0.06 
  
0.08 
  
0.05 
  Prob > F 0.01 
  
0.31 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0 
  
0.31 
   
 
Irritation Contempt Joy Jealousy Surprise 
 
b se p b se p b se p b se p b se p 
   0.03*** 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.2 -0.01 0.01 0.64 
     0.14 0.7 0.84 0.19 0.92 0.84 1.06 1.08 0.33 0.16 0.78 0.84 0.79 1.01 0.43 
     ×    0 0.01 0.83 0 0.01 0.97 -0.02 0.02 0.3 -0.01 0.01 0.6 -0.01 0.01 0.44 
non-UK -0.47 0.45 0.3 0.48 0.46 0.3 0.27 0.51 0.6 0.33 0.51 0.52 0.19 0.47 0.69 
Experience -0.08 0.14 0.59 0.05 0.15 0.74 -0.35** 0.16 0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.55 -0.16 0.13 0.22 
     × non-UK -0.08 0.67 0.91 0 0.66 0.99 0.14 0.68 0.84 0.36 0.64 0.57 0.38 0.61 0.53 
Male 0.52 0.36 0.14 0.19 0.35 0.58 0.15 0.37 0.67 0.63* 0.33 0.06 -0.23 0.33 0.49 
Age -0.07 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.85 0.01 0.04 0.74 -0.09** 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.74 
Obs 141 
  
138 
  
141 
  
141 
  
141 
  
Pseudo R-Square 0.07   0.02   0.04   0.03   0.02   
Prob > F 0   0.4   0.09   0.2   0.05   
Note: Ordered logit regressions with robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Tobit regressions on punishment for anger, irritation and contempt 
 
Anger Irritation Contempt 
 
b se p B se p b se p 
      40.29 38.31 0.29 44.76 38.78 0.25 130.84*** 40.41 0 
non UK 46.54 28.48 0.1 54.57* 28.17 0.05 40.99 27.56 0.14 
     × nonUK -26.22 34.97 0.45 -16.79 33.68 0.62 -3.15 35.58 0.93 
Experience 1.39 16.24 0.93 19.46 19.32 0.32 33.51* 17.75 0.06 
Male -35.21* 20.07 0.08 -29.1 20.12 0.15 -22.16 19.39 0.26 
Age -2.21 1.86 0.24 -3.02 1.89 0.11 -4.27** 1.83 0.02 
Anger 0.03 12.8 1 
   
   
      × Anger 28.37** 11.59 0.02    
   
     ×       × Anger -23.92** 10.15 0.02    
   
     × Anger 11.96 9.16 0.19    
   
Experience × Anger -1.33 3.68 0.72 
   
   
Irritation 
   
5.14 14.52 0.72    
      × Irritation    
32.04*** 12.01 0.01    
     ×       × Irritation    
-29.08*** 10.77 0.01    
     × Irritation    
14.93 9.36 0.11    
Experience × Irritation 
   
-5.95 4.33 0.17    
Contempt 
      
45.42** 17.55 0.01 
      × Contempt       
1.76 13.01 0.89 
     ×       × Contempt       
-32.01*** 11.66 0.01 
     × Contempt       
10.01 9.06 0.27 
Experience × Contempt 
      
-13.44** 5.27 0.01 
Constant 85.83*** 12.58 0 88.19*** 12.92 0 84.38*** 12.23 0 
Obs 141 
  
141 
  
138   
Pseudo R-Square 0.09 
  
0.09 
  
0.09   
Df 130 
  
130 
  
127   
Prob > F 0 
  
0 
  
0   
Note: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors.  
 
 is expressed in percentage. Hence, the beta coefficients 
identify percentages. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Figure 1: Patterns of variable and constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratios 
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Figure 2: Relationship between punishment rate and take rate 
 
Note: The locally weighted regressions were computed using a bandwith of 0.8 (80% of the 
data). 
Figure 3: Predicted punishment rate against take rate 
 
Note: The dashed line is the predicted punishment rate under a variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio, the solid line is the 
predicted punishment rate under a constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. The crossed area measures the extent to which the 
punishment was inflated (t >56%) or deflated (t < 56%) under the variable ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio compared to the 
constant ‘fine-to-fee’ ratio. 
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Figure 4: Relationship between emotions and take rate  
 
Note: The locally weighted regressions were computed using a bandwith of 0.8 (80% of the data). 
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of expected and actual take rates 
 
 
Note: optimistic responders (who expected a higher take rate than the actual take rate) are identified by dots 
above the 45 line; pessimistic responders (who expected a lower take rate than the actual take rate) are identified 
by dots below the 45 line.  
  
